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This chapter focuses on the relation between terrorism and publicity. It takes 
particular interest in how different societal actors within the political and administrative 
spheres and within the media itself use media for their specific purposes. The role 
of journalists is discussed in the light of recent debates on the role of media and 
media professionals in society, and the changes that occur due to the emergence of 
new forms of media that are outside of the regulation and responsibility that earlier 
has – at least to some extent – guided mass media. It arrives at a conclusion that 
legitimate power elites, illegitimate groups, media and journalists all find benefits in 
playing out the scare factor that makes terror work, thus sustaining an incestuous 
spiral built on fear.
Introduction
It is a long-standing claim that society has become mediated. People today live in a 
world that more than before extends outside their immediate sphere of observation, 
and the media sphere thus becomes crucial for people to know even the most basic 
facts about their relevant surrounding. Societal involvement and the carrying out of 
basic functions increasingly requires people to also interact via media – from e-mail 
to more advanced social networks that guide everyday life. This development has 
been called mediation (Livingstone 2009).
Although the heightened attention towards media makes itself appear as a 
novel development, it goes without saying that the media’s role in society is not 
something new. Also, just as terrorism is not a new phenomenon (Chaliand and 
Blin 2007), there is nothing new in the connection between actions that have been 
labelled – or label themselves – acts of terrorism, and the representation of these 
actions in the media. In an obscure writing titled Advice for Terrorists, published in 
the journal Freiheit, September 13, 1884, the anarchist John Most wrote:
We have said a hundred times or more that when modern revolutionaries carry out 
action, what is important is not solely the actions themselves but also the propagandistic 
effect that they are able to achieve. Hence, we preach not only action in and of itself, 
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but also action as propaganda. (Most 1884, cited in Laqueur and Alexander 1978/1987, 
105.)
This approach evidently puts the expected representation of the action in the 
centre of the planning and of the action itself. In the words of John Most:  
Since we believe that the propaganda of action is of use, we must be prepared to 
accept whatever attendant circumstances it involves. Everyone now knows, from 
experience, that the more highly placed the one shot or blown up, and the more perfectly 
executed the attempt, the greater the propagandistic effect. The basic preconditions of 
success are methodological preparation…(Most 1884, cited in Laqueur and Alexander 
1978/1987, 100.)
In the light of the most salient act in this line, taken in recent years, some lines 
in E.B Whites legendary presentation of New York appear prophetical:
All dwellers in cities must live with the stubborn fact of annihilation; in New York the 
fact is somewhat more concentrated because of the concentration of the city itself, and 
because, of all targets, New York has a certain clear priority. In the mind of whatever 
perverted dreamer might loose the lightning, New York must hold a steady, irresistible 
charm. (White 1949/1999, 54.) 
The importance of publicity is, however, not only understood among those who 
commit actions that in media are reported as terrorism. Also their counterparts, 
the military and police forces, understand the relevance of affecting the public 
mind. Thus, as research shows, major incidents have been followed by relevant 
improvements in the conditions for the official violence apparatus. Journalists are 
affected to be more patriotic (Barnett and Reynolds 2009; Nacos 2007); increases 
in the budget for anti-terror activities occur (Alexander 2006a; Parmentier 2006; 
Schneckener 2006). The media are considered to have an impact on how the 
conflict spiral is waged (Brown 2003, 49). As a result, a growth in support occurs; 
not only of political leaders in power (in the US, the Congress and the President), 
but also of the executive branches of authorities responsible for intelligence and 
military (Brewer, Aday and Gross 2003, 247). This would mark a shift from the 
symbolic patriotism that builds on a general affection that one feels for the nation’s 
way of life and values towards a blind patriotism, providing unconditional support 
for its institutions and policies (c.f., Parker 2010, 97).
With an increasingly mediated society, now boosted by the Internet, the expected 
dissemination through media of news on dramatic events is continuingly growing. 
With new techniques that have introduced real time television and prime time war 
(Denton Jr. 1993; Pritchard 2003; Watt 2003) the dissemination of news becomes 
more rapid than ever (Greenberg et al 2002). This development puts journalism 
and the conduct of media under severe strain in finding a balance in its reporting of 
events that by some are considered acts aiming at liberation and by others as acts 
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of terror. Ultimately, we may ask whether current reporting standards adequately fit 
the challenges that journalists are facing.
The Mediatization Dilemma
In current debate on how media interacts with society, one important aspect is 
how the autonomous professionalism developed by journalists interacts with the 
political system. This has been called mediatization of political communication, 
signifying that journalists take a professional role in regard to other institutions 
in society. Journalists act according to a media logic. This logic is based on 
professional standards established in education and workplace practice; growing 
out of an increasingly professionalized trade, and on legislation and ethical rules 
(see, e.g., EthicNet), standardized through international research and professional 
co-operation. All these contribute to a homogenization of the role perceptions of 
journalists worldwide. In order to affect how the public opinion is informed, other 
actors in societal life are then acting in anticipation of the outcome of the media 
coverage, guided by professionalized journalists. (Asp 1986; Asp and Esaiasson 
1996; Strömbäck 2009).
From what has been argued above, it is more than apparent that all types of 
actors that involve themselves with actions of politically oriented violence are quite 
conscious of how media will reflect their actions; and apparently also in many cases 
motivated by this aspect in shaping their actions. The question of how journalists 
should act in relation to politically oriented violence has been raised by many. 
Looking at the longue-durée of terrorism, Wieviorka (1988) has pointed to the 
different relationships that political movements with a violent agenda have with 
media, from indifference or even adversarial attitudes to active usage of the 
anticipated actions of media as part of their strategy. Wilkinson (1997, 62) has 
discussed political movement’s use of violence as a method of hijacking the media, 
warning journalists of the consequences of real time television-type reporting 
and calling for self-restrictive behaviour by journalists. More recent analysts (e.g., 
Alves, 2007) have pointed to the entrance of the Internet as a part of publicity, 
pointing to the liberative potential in today´s media society that prevents oppressive 
governments from censoring information – which would include also information 
covering political violence.
The approaches cover broad ground and are clearly ideological in nature. 
Although several efforts to define terrorism have been made (c.f., Wilkinson 1997, 
51; Alexander 2006a, 14; for a discussion, Merari 2007), the concept itself tends 
to escape all essentialist definitions; as Barnett and Reynolds (2009) point out the 
definition of the concept often constructs a loop: the use of the word terrorism in 
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media often conforms to what the government calls terrorism. Noting the often 
quoted sentence, that “one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter (Barnett 
and Reynolds 2009, 5)., they cite the guidelines of BBC, Reuters, and Al Jazeera 
for reporting on incidents that would fall under this concept, noting that the use of 
more specific (attack, bombing, etc.) words are to be recommended (Barnett and 
Reynolds 2009, 41–44). 
Avoiding the word terrorism itself, however, does not solve the problems of how 
to cover the reporting of the events. The question is, then, what role the media take 
in reporting of the conflicted publicity agendas presenting themselves each time 
when the concept or its derivates are used. This raises the question of the logic of 
the involvement of media: is this logic guided by an awareness of the role of the 
media in the process? The questions can be posed as a distinction between media 
professionals as part of mediation or as partners in mediatization (c.f., Asp 1986; 
Livingstone 2009). Are media merely mediating the incidents reported under the 
heading of terrorism as they evolve?  Or are they, as in the mediatized coverage 
of other types of political events, challenging sources, looking at backgrounds, 
and in other ways bringing the critical stance and knowledge cultivated within 
professionalized journalism into play? Are journalists in their reporting acting with 
consideration of the outcome of their reporting? And if they are, how, and at what 
stage does this distinction between mediation and mediatization occur? 
These questions become highly ideological, as various reflections through 
different media of events labelled as terrorism are by no means innocent. Whilst 
the journalists may not sympathize with perpetrators of violence – or the counter-
measures taken by authorities, media logics may drive publicity towards blindly 
being a tool for “terrorist” action (c.f., Nacos 2007, 38), but also for “patriotic” counter 
action (Husband and Alam 2011, 83–87). 
Reporting of other political events tend, in a mediatized logic, to build on 
professional reflection by the media’s own actors, most pertinently, the journalists. 
How does the reporting on political actions that fall under the label terrorism come 
out in comparison with other political reporting? 
Real Time War and Prime Time War
As noted above, media have developed new communication techniques that 
– at least apparently – bring the broad public to the scene in real time. Such 
techniques have dramatically changed the conditions for reporting news. Why is 
this important? Because, as politicians and news journalists intuitively know, and 
as also experimental research tells us (e.g., Engel, Kube and Kurschilgen 2011, 
15–16), first impressions matter and bad impressions leave more trace than good. 
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Thus, when an incident occurs, massive and similar media coverage leave a mark 
on the audience that will later affect perception of further developments of the story.
With modern communication techniques, the pace of the newsbeat has 
dramatically increased. Nacos (2007, 47) points out that the attack on Pearl Harbour 
in 1941 were first reported in radio broadcasts on the US mainland only three 
hours later. The first pictures were published a week later. Diffusion studies show 
that today, within these same three hours, more than 90 percent of the audience 
will be informed, if the incident occurs on a time of day when people are awake 
(Moring 1996; Greenberg et al. 2002; Kanihan and Gale 2003). Furthermore, if the 
news is big enough, this speedy news diffusion is global. According to research 
made immediately after the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre in New York in 
September 2011, 98 percent of the Hungarians new about the attack soon after it 
had happened (Nacos 2007, 52). 
Also earlier, attacks that were clearly staged for the media – such as the incident 
in Munich in 1972 where members of the Israeli Olympic team were taken hostage 
and killed by the Palestinian Black September organization – have been reported 
with television pictures worldwide without delay. This was, however, a matter 
of negotiation within many newsrooms. Having myself been a journalist at the 
Swedish radio news in Finland at the time, I recall the discussions between sports 
reporters on the spot and home-based journalists specializing on foreign news on 
how this incident should be covered. Foreign news journalists presented doubts 
regarding the competence of sports reporters to contextualize the incident. The 
decision taken was, however, that the unfolding events were transmitted directly to 
the audience by sports journalists reporting from the spot.
In the reporting of 9/11, the leaders of the Finnish Broadcasting Company after 
a short discussion decided that news footage will be immediately relayed to the 
audience, one reason being that all other news media will do this as well, and 
no news provider can stay behind. The intervention of foreign news journalists, 
including efforts to contextualize the dramatic footage, thus came along as 
commentary and post hoc in summarizing newscasts. The same decisions were 
taken – more or less explicitly, by broadcast media throughout the world. This 
marked the by far most efficient hijacking of the media so far, followed by an also 
unprecedented retaliation by the Bush administration.
The Internet Society Knows No Borders
For good or for bad, also Internet today has become a relevant medium in the 
diffusion of news on conflicts that by authorities are labelled terrorism. Already 
in the 9/11 incident two-thirds of the audience in USA mentioned Internet as an 
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information source (Nacos 2007, 49). The importance of Internet and mobile 
phones has been apparent also in the diffusion of other heavy news incidents, 
such as the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004, or the upheaval in Arabic states 
in Northern Africa in 2011. Different to national news media, these media outlets 
are almost impossible to censor (Hoffman 2006; Alves 2007). Thus they present a 
particular challenge for authorities who may wish to affect the reporting of events, 
particularly in authoritarian systems that have a strictly controlled media.
At the same time Internet brings yet another reason for traditional news media 
to react on the spot. Internet has challenged the top-down logics of traditional mass 
media, meaning that events will disseminate from bottom-up, with or without the 
contribution of the traditional established mass media platforms and sometimes 
through their own blogs. 
The changing media environment has – for better or for worse – left more 
reflective news practitioners in a catch-22 situation: being left behind by the real-
time transmission of evolving events risks losing the audience, whilst it is required to 
secure a more reflective and contextualized reporting. Going with the flow of events 
may secure an audience but gives those actors that are outside the media the 
privilege of staging the scene according to their (obscure) agendas. Commentary 
comes second, when first effects on the audience are already in place.  
Media Making the News or Making Media the News?
The temptation to captivate audiences with new media techniques and real time 
coverage has in some cases been given tragicomic forms. Thus many newspapers 
in Finland and elsewhere chose to publish screenshots – that is photographs taken 
off the television screen; and in these cases in a most evident way – from CNN when 
covering the Gulf War. In the coverage of 9/11 screenshots were illustrating the falling 
towers, but also the speeches of President George W. Bush when he announced 
American counter-measures. The irony in this type of journalistic coverage is that 
sharper original photographs would most likely have been available. Apparently, 
real time media has so much stolen the show that also serious newspapers fall for 
the temptation to present events through representations of the real time coverage.
 In a certain sense, this creates a double loop reminding of the famous painting 
of a pipe by René Magritte, with the text “This is not a pipe”. In this case: This 
is not President Bush. It is not even a representation of President Bush. It is a 
representation of a representation of President Bush, appearing on real time 
television.
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In covering news this way, even serious newspapers that build on a reputation 
that they have built by offering context, background and analysis, even further 
enhance the character of here and now. This lack – in the heat of the occurring 
newsbeat – of a broader and deeper perspective works into the hands of those 
parties that strive to, through the media, maximize the advantage of publicity; be 
it a scare factor, seeking for sympathy, or seeking for patriotic sentiments in order 
to legitimize counter-violence. The result is easy to predict. Such media coverage 
serves the interest of those who seek polarization rather than in the service of 
moderation and a deeper understanding of the roots of a conflict (c.f. Coe et al. 
2008, 202).
It must be underlined that not all media, and not all media coverage, follow this 
pattern. Contextualizing commentary and analysis are indeed included in the media 
coverage as well. It does,however, tend to fall behind the more dramatic coverage 
both in first page attention and in time. Thus often the agenda has been set and the 
story framed by a few dominant themes in advance of more considered reportage 
being available (Scheufele 1999). The crucial impact of the first formative moments 
of coverage is at the mercy of the logics established by real time television in prime 
time war.
The Empire Strikes Back – A Weberian Perspective
A somewhat deeper look at where the above described media logic leads – in light 
of what we know from communication theory and campaign research – leads to 
rather pessimistic conclusions. It is a well established fact since early effect studies 
(Lazarsfeld et al. 1944) that communication rather strengthens existing attitudes 
than changes them. As we shall see, the reinforcement effect has also been found 
by research on how attitudes have developed after the reporting in the media of 
incidents that authorities label as deeds of terrorism. 
As was already noted, the initiators of political violence that is labelled terrorism 
tend to seek public effect. Also for the media much is at stake. The public is alerted; 
we know from the audience research referred to above that ratings grew sky-high 
after the 9/11 incident. Furthermore, the public reaction to the incident is also of 
direct interest to authorities. We know from studies in a Weberian tradition on the 
logics of administration that growth tends to be a value in itself for all organizations, 
including the legitimate violence- and counter-violence organizations of the state. 
From this we may infer that there are no innocent parties when the dramatic event 
of a “terrorist” act is reported.
As noted briefly in the outset of this chapter, the public reactions registered in 
research of opinion changes in Western countries have shown increase in system 
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support. Brewer et al. (2003, 247–248) report increase in presidential support, 
support of the congress, confidence in intelligence and in the military in USA after 
the 9/11 incident. This has in many cases been followed by the reorganization of 
security management including increased resources in many states, as witnessed 
in the contributions to a relatively recent book on counterterrorism (Alexander, ed., 
2006). The authors point to quite concrete counter-terrorism investments in, for 
example, USA, France and Germany after this incident.
Among the examples presented, we find the establishment of a pre-emptive 
strategy by the Bush administration, including the instalment of the Patriot Act 
(2001), enabling the government to be better equipped to “identify, investigate, 
follow, detain, prosecute, and punish suspected terrorists” (Alexander 2006a, 
p.37). Among the measures to develop and implement a national strategy to secure 
the United States from terrorist threats, a new Department of Homeland Security 
was created in 2003: an extraordinary reorganization of governmental resources 
to integrate twenty-two agencies and 180,000 employees to provide effective 
intergovernmental cooperation on national, state, and local levels (Alexander, 
2006a, 39). 
In France, after 9/11, earlier strategies established in the early 1980s of not 
using special legislation were abandoned. Specific legislative measures were 
taken, such as a law on everyday security and combating terrorism in November 
2001, allowing for temporary use of counter-terrorism measures (Parmentier, 
2006, 69). Whilst recognizing that fighting terrorism involves more than military 
and repressive measures, France entered into international cooperation including 
French Intelligence  setting up a counterterrorism intelligence center, Alliance 
Base, in Paris together with the CIA in 2002 (Parmentier 2006, 71: Alexander, 
2006b, 196).
In Germany, after 9/11, the Federal Government approved two security 
packages and various measures including special budget lines in order to destroy 
terrorist structures through investigation, protect the population and remove causes 
for terrorism and repel terrorists before they can launch an attack.  International 
measures were taken to the use of military force for counterterrorism purposes 
outside Germany. For 2002, the Federal Government earmarked a special budget of 
1.47 billion Euros for the fight against terrorism. Additional resources were divided, 
e.g., to the army to improve crisis management, to the Federal Ministry of Interior 
to strengthen border control and homeland security, to the Foreign Office and the 
Development Ministry to address causes of terrorism, and for strengthening the 
Intelligence Service (Schneckener 2006, 85–86).
A recent example, not unexpected in the light of the examples above, is the 
increase in the Norwegian police resources after the Utøya shooting in July 2011. 
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The budget increased with almost 90 million Euros to improve preparedness and 
to secure a state of alert (Politiet 2011).
Media’s Role for the Incestuous Spiral of 
Violence and Counter-violence
All the examples of political and financial measures listed in the section above were 
controversial in nature. It is therefore evident that the enormous public attention that 
followed the 9/11 attack was instrumental in paving the way for the considerable 
measures, mentioned above, to strengthen the counter-violence machinery of the 
states. This mechanism has been made explicit in a series of suggestions regarding 
the media/war relationship by Brown (2003).
Field commanders will have declining autonomy: Because of the potential political 
significance of their actions their superiors will constantly monitor and seek to control 
their actions. As the diversity of media sources grow, managing the coverage of war 
will become more important …
… To put it crudely, the separation between the political and the military as spheres 
of activity become blurred. The communicative elements of warfare have grown in 
importance. (Brown 2003, 49.)
In the light of what we know from campaign research, that attitudes tend to 
be reinforced rather than changed, it is not far fetched to assume that parallel 
logics appear on the other side of the conflict. Scholars have shown the absurdity 
in constructing a polarized conflict on the alleged grounds of religions (e.g., 
Thussu 2006, 9–10). It would, however, be logical to assume that if such a conflict 
description is anyway established through military measures, supported by political 
messages internationally carried by the media, a polarization occurs that benefit 
the resource claims for different parties carrying a violent agenda. This mechanism 
is what we here call an incestuous spiral.
The polarization effect can be further strengthened by differences in the media 
worlds that people live in. The ownership and political stance of dominant news 
media also play a role.  However globalized the world may be the news agenda of, for 
example, American Fox News with its conservative leanings and growing audience 
will probably carry strong impact on the sentiments of numerous American citizens 
(Coe et al. 2004, 201–202). Efforts from agencies founded in the Arab world and 
representing perspectives from under-reported regions, such as Al Jazeera, do 
not have much of a chance to hit home in this audience. Moderating voices easily 
fall between chairs, once the story-line has been established in people’s minds. 
As noted above, it is not only easier to reinforce images than to change them; first 
impressions tend to colour perception of further information, and bad impressions 
carry better than good.
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The complex relationship between terrorism and the media has been discussed 
by many authors; Wieviorka (1988, 44) talks about a calculated manipulation of 
what [terrorists] know of media operations; Miller (1982, 1) has called terrorism the 
media’s step child. Wilkinson (1997) writes
It would be foolish to deny that many modern terrorists and certain sections of the mass 
media can appear to become locked in a relationship of considerable mutual benefit. 
The former want to appear on prime time TV to obtain not only massive, possibly world-
wide, publicity but also the aura of legitimisation that such media attention gains for them 
in the eyes of their own followers and sympathisers. For the mass media organisations 
the coverage of terrorism, especially prolonged incidents such as hijackings and 
hostage situations, provides an endless source of sensational and visually compelling 
news stories capable of boosting audience/readership figures. (Wilkinson 1997, 52.)
At the same time it is evident that the media cannot remain silent about dramatic 
news events. They have to report them, however manipulated they may be. This 
is the case even when media manipulation is obviously inherent in the act itself, 
such as in the examples of the Black September attack in Munich 1972 or the 9/11 
incident. 
However, in the final round, the empire strikes back. Nacos (2007) unmasks 
what here is called the incestuous relationship formed by violence, counter-violence 
and the media when she notes that
The act of terrorism is a master key for unlocking the door that grants access to the 
mass media. This means that crisis managers and response specialists compete with 
the perpetrators of political violence in that each side wants to have the loudest and 
most persuasive voice and messages. In this competition, terrorists seem to start out 
with a significant advantage because their violent deeds are a powerful message that 
commends the mass media’s attention … But response specialists, crisis managers 
(… …) and political leaders (… …) are nevertheless in excellent position to dominate 
the news because they are  part of the cornerstones in the “Triangle of Political 
Communication” with formal and informal links and relationships in place before 
emergencies arise. (Nacos 2007, 197)
As has been shown above, in the flood of contrasting and contradicting media 
messages following dramatic clashes labelled as acts of terrorism, the audience is 
likely to lean on previously established attitudes. Furthermore, orientation towards 
security in shocking situations provides political leaders as well as administrative 
bodies – identified as rescue teams and counterterrorism forces – with compelling 
arguments for increased legitimacy. This, again, has in cases cited above proven 
to justify a strengthened resource base. 
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In Conclusion
Returning to the crucial question, presented at the outset of this chapter: What 
line of action can journalism, seeking an ethically defendable line of coverage, 
take in the promiscuous relation between the different forms of political violence 
as described above? It is clear that the media cannot not report on terrorism and 
eventual counter measures. Whilst it would be against the basic ethos of news 
reporting, it would also be counterproductive in a world that is open to global 
rumours spread in real-time through the Internet and mobile phones.  
New media also content-wise present a challenge to journalism, as the 
importance of fast reporting is growing in the competition with down-up news 
diffusion originating from uncountable sources of various qualities. Serious 
journalism takes time. It is worth reflecting on that not only the yellow press but also 
some serious web media initially reported the shooting in Norway on August 2011 
that was carried out by a Norwegian rightwing extremist as having been initiated 
by activists in the Middle East. This is not the first error in this line by the media.
In this context, serious mass media that guard their credibility have an even more 
important role than before. The audience must know where to turn for an unbiased 
and as truthful reporting as possible. This can only be secured by sustaining high 
standards of critical journalism, and avoiding the temptations of the speculative 
news beat of the first moments of reporting.
The style of involvement of the media is critical in the wake of such dramatic and 
politically sensitive events as those discussed in this chapter. The spontaneous, 
or laissez faire style of reporting evidently leads to further polarization. If the 
contribution of media – in the context of the ongoing information war around 
violence and counter-violence of today – shall lead to anything else than further 
polarization, the media will have to take responsibility. The importance of 
considerate, contextualizing and balanced journalism grows. And furthermore, 
the media must be willing to present this information with the same visibility and 
prominence as the spontaneous reporting growing out of the actions themselves. 
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